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In a recent article, Professors Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee
Malcolm provided an intriguing debate1 over the standard of scrutiny that
should be applied to restrictions on the Second Amendment in the wake of
McDonald v. City of Chicago.2 This Essay illuminates two aspects of that
debate.
The first is Professor Rosenthal’s concern regarding the
constitutionality of open-carry or concealed-carry prohibitions.
He
inaccurately claims that the Founders left insufficient historical evidence to
support such prohibitions.3 Thus, this Essay addresses those concerns
through the use of “historical guideposts.”4 The second aspect this Essay
addresses is Rosenthal and Malcolm’s characterization of the Second
†
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Amendment’s “well regulated militia” language,5 for it highlights a
historical and legal error that continues to pollute contemporary Second
Amendment jurisprudence. As this Essay explains, a “well regulated
militia” does not merely equate to “well-trained,”6 nor is it a vehicle to
analyze gun control regulations7 in the constraints of the opinion in District
of Columbia v. Heller.8
I.

SCRIBBLE SCRABBLE REDUX: HISTORICAL GUIDEPOSTS, THE PUBLIC
GOOD, AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
As Professor Rosenthal astutely points out,9 the Heller Court has
received much criticism for its classification of longstanding prohibitions.10
Professor Rosenthal then asks whether Heller’s presumptively lawful
prohibitions will “one day be discarded as inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Second Amendment,” for “[f]raming-era practice appears to
be of little help.”11 Indeed, the Heller Court painted with a broad stroke
what constitutes a “presumptively lawful” firearm regulation.12 However,
the Founding Fathers provided us with some guidance as to whether a
challenged regulation falls within the constitutional restraints of the Second
Amendment.13
What we today refer to as gun control is not a twentieth-century
phenomenon. Since the Norman Conquest, restrictions began appearing on
the carrying or using of “arms” as a means to prevent public injury. King
Alfred had restrictions on the drawing of any weapon “in the king’s hall”14
and the improper carrying of a spear to prevent injury.15 In 1328, King
Edward III implemented restrictions on riding or going armed in public

5

See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 91–94, 106, 113–14.
Compare id. at 106 (“[The Heller Court] did breeze by it and it does merely mean ‘welltrained.’”), with Patrick J. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia”
Asserted and Proven with Commentary on the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence,
3 NORTHEASTERN L.J. 1, 9 (2011), available at http://www.nulj.org/journal/Charles.pdf (“A ‘wellregulated militia’ means much more. It defines an espirit de corps and a civic duty to be properly
disciplined and trained in the art of war.”).
7
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 91–94.
8
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
9
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 91–92.
10
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
11
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 92.
12
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.
13
See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 91–92 (“Commentators have suggested that the Court
took a categorical approach in which ‘core’ Second Amendment interests receive something close to
absolute protection, while more penumbral interests are subject to greater regulation. Still, it is far from
clear how to go about determining whether a challenged regulation implicates only penumbral interests.
Framing-era practice appears to be of little help.” (footnote omitted)).
14
THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 69 (F.L. Attenborough ed., 1922).
15
Id. at 79–81.
6
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places or in the presence of government officials.16 In 1542, King Henry
VIII placed a prohibition on “little shorte handguns, and little hagbutts,”
which were a “great [peril] and [continual fear] and [danger] of the Kings
most [loving] subjects.”17 Likewise, in 1787, the Pennsylvania Minority
Dissent, which was comprised of those members of the Pennsylvania
Constitutional Convention that voted against ratifying the Constitution due
to the lack of a Bill of Rights, acknowledged it was lawful to disarm
individuals for “crimes committed” or when the legislature determined
there may be “real danger of public injury from individuals.”18
This brief overview reveals that “arms” regulations intended to
preserve the peace, as well as to prevent public injury, are part of our
Anglo-American tradition. Whether there is a perfect eighteenth-century
parallel to modern gun control regulations is not the appropriate question
that jurists should examine when determining whether Second Amendment
challenges are consistent with framing-era practice.19 For with the
advancement of firearm technology, especially the portability, firing rate,
and power by which modern firearms operate, it is rare for a modern gun
control regulation to mirror an eighteenth-century restriction.20
Therefore, the proper question jurists should ask when examining the
historical acceptance of modern gun control regulations is whether the
regulation would be “publicly accepted” in the framing era. In other words,
the question is whether the Founders would have accepted the restriction as
necessary to prevent “public injury” or as in the interest of the “public
good.”21 This question is answered by examining the ideological and
philosophical origins of gun control, not by finding an exact eighteenthcentury parallel. While one may argue this form of judicial inquiry
resembles Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach in a historical
form,22 the entire purpose of the Second Amendment was the furtherance of
the public good.23 This holds true whether one examines the “right to keep

16

See Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.).
33 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 1 (1541) (Eng.).
18
The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention, of the State of
Pennsylvania, to Their Constituents, PENN. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, at 1.
19
For a variance of approaches in examining the historical pedigree of modern gun control
regulations, see United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26508, at *13–20 (4th
Cir. Dec. 30, 2010) (following United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g
en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010)); Skoien, 587 F.3d at 808–09; United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d
8, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2009) (looking first to nineteenth-century state laws imposing similar restrictions as
the Heller Court did); and United States v. Brown, 715 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695–99 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(discussing the history of arms restrictions at the founding).
20
See Charles, supra note 4, at 12, 15, 38.
21
See id. at 33–39.
22
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23
Charles, supra note 6, at 74–75, 100–02.
17
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and bear arms” in either the constraints of the Heller right to self-defense of
the home or as a militia right to take part in the common defense.24
To illustrate this point, this Essay examines a 1786–1787 editorial
debate over the constitutionality of the Portland Convention.25 The
Convention was an assemblage of Maine counties that discussed a
separation from Massachusetts.26 Although the Convention sought to
exercise legal means to form an independent Maine, it raised suspicions of
another rebellion like Shays’s Rebellion, which was taking place at the
same time.27 Illegal assemblages of armed men were shutting down
courthouses throughout Massachusetts, leaving much uncertainty as to the
future of the new American republic.28
The debate began with an editorial penned by the anonymous Senex.
He described the different assemblages as “mere mobs” in violation of the
1780 Massachusetts Constitution.29 In particular, Senex thought these
assemblages violated Articles VII and XIX of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights. Article VII embodied William Blackstone’s right of
governmental self-preservation,30 while Article XIX was a predecessor to
the First Amendment.31
Although there was no Massachusetts statute stating that these
independent assemblages were unlawful, Senex asserted they were “evil
and dangerous—subversive of all order, peace, or security.”32 He viewed
these “[c]ounty [m]obs” as violating the law because Articles VII and XIX

24

See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929), overruled in part by Girouard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1886).
25
For previous commentary on this debate, see Saul Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation and
the Second Amendment: A Closer Look at the Evidence, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 197, 197–98 (2007), and
Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America:
The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 170–71 (2007).
26
1 WILLIAM WILLIS, THE HISTORY OF PORTLAND, FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT: WITH NOTICES
OF THE NEIGHBORING TOWNS, AND OF THE CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN MAINE 253–56 (Portland,
Me., Day, Fraser & Co. 1831).
27
Id.
28
See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY
THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 43–44, 83–87 (2009).
29
Senex, Shades of Retirement, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Sept. 21, 1786, at 2.
30
MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. I, art. VII (“[T]he people alone have an incontestable, unalienable,
and indefeasible right to institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same when their
protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it.”). For a history of Blackstone’s right of selfpreservation and resistance, see Patrick J. Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A
True Legal and Historical Understanding of the Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE NOVO 18, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/CHARLES_2010_18.pdf.
31
MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. I, art. XIX (“The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable
manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give instructions to their representatives, and to
request the legislative body, by way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs
done them, and of the grievances they suffer.”).
32
Senex, supra note 29.
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provided the constitutional vehicle to redress grievances.33 In other words,
“the people of each town [must] follow the dictates of their invaluable
Constitution, by remonstrances to the legislature, and instructions to their
several representatives.”34 Any other method of redress would advance
“anarchy and confusion so incident to mobs and conventions.”35
Under the pen name Scribble Scrabble, Judge George Thatcher, a
member of the First United States Congress, responded to Senex’s broad
classification of lawful conventions as mobs.36 Also a member of the
Portland Convention, Thatcher separated the Convention from unlawful
assemblies like the Shays’s insurgents on the grounds that the former
“thought they were discharging their duty in a legal way.”37 It is here that
the exchange between Senex and Thatcher turned to the rules of
constitutional interpretation.
Senex’s response was one of strict
construction. He believed that if the Declaration of Rights granted the
mode to redress injuries, only through that constitutional vehicle may the
people “request (or even demand)” that such injuries be resolved.38 In
contrast, Thatcher interpreted the Declaration of Rights as a social compact
with legislative constitutional limits. To Thatcher, the Declaration was not
the totality of the people’s rights, but a list of rights that the government
could never usurp.
Thatcher’s main problem with Senex’s interpretation was the way he
grouped the Shays’s insurgents, who were unlawfully armed and rebelling
against the laws of Massachusetts, with the peaceful Portland Convention
that was seeking “[e]nquiry and information” to erect themselves into a
government.39 Thatcher elaborated:
In one county the people meet in a Convention to collect the sentiments of the
people, and lay them before the General Court. In another they assemble in
town meetings, and consult upon the public good. In some counties the people
assemble in bodies, and with force and arms, prevent the Courts of Justice
sitting according to law.
....
When we consider the late Portland Convention, as to its constitution and to
its end, it appears to me essentially different from the meetings of the people in
some of the western counties . . . .40

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
See Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian
Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 161 (2007).
37
Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Oct. 5, 1786, at 2 (emphasis added).
38
Senex, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Oct. 19, 1786, at 2.
39
Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Nov. 2, 1786, at 1.
40
Id. (emphasis added).
34
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Thatcher’s reference to the public good is constitutionally significant,
for it was the entire basis by which eighteenth-century lawmaking and
constitutional interpretation were premised.41 Most importantly, for the
purposes of this Essay, the reference to the public good is a premise that
Thatcher would use to explain the right to keep and bear arms in the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution.
Thatcher’s basis for examining the
constitutional restraints on the use of arms was to illustrate the impropriety
of Senex’s limited interpretation of the Declaration of Rights. In Thatcher’s
words: “[W]here the declaration secures a particular right, in itself
alienable, or the use of a right, in the people, it does not at the same time
contain, by implication, a negative of any other use of that right.”42
For instance, Article XVII of the 1780 Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights states, “The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the
common defence . . . and the military power shall always be held in an
exact subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it.”43 Thatcher
interpreted this provision as not prohibiting the people from “using arms for
other purposes than common defence.”44 Thatcher reasoned that because
Article XVII “does not contain a negative,” “the people have the full
uncontrouled use of arms, as much as though the Declaration had been
silent upon that head.”45
Thatcher was not claiming that Article XVII afforded an unalienable
right to arms for whatever purpose. He viewed the use of arms for other
purposes as an “alienable right” that the legislature has the “power to
controul” in “all cases . . . whenever they shall think the good of the whole
require it.”46 Instead, Thatcher was arguing the Declaration recognizes core
“rights and privileges” that are “esteemed essential to the very being of
society; and therefore guarded, by being declared such, and prefixed to the
constitution as a memento that they are never to be infringed.”47 To
paraphrase, Thatcher viewed the Declaration of Rights as embodying a
constitutional bottom upon which the legislature could never infringe. In
the case of Article XVII, this meant that the Massachusetts Assembly could
41

See 2 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 30 (1794) (tracing the origins of the concept of the public good to Machiavelli);
Samuel Adams, Mass. Lieutenant-Governor, Speech to the Massachusetts House of Representatives and
Senate (Jan. 17, 1794), in RESOLVES OF THE GENERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 33, 34 (1794) (“It is therein declared, that Government is instituted for the common
good; not for the profit, honor or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men.”); see also
Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Our Constitutional
Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 457, 477–523 (2011)
(discussing the “public good” in lawmaking and eighteenth-century constitutionalism).
42
Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Dec. 8, 1786, at 1.
43
MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. I, art. XVII.
44
Scribble Scrabble, supra note 42.
45
Id.
46
Id. (emphasis added).
47
Id.
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never deprive the people from participating in the common defense. On the
other hand, all other uses of arms were alienable and could be “abridged by
the legislature as they may think for the general good.”48
On January 12, 1787, Senex replied to Thatcher’s interpretation of the
Declaration of Rights. He feared that Thatcher was inferring that the
general people had a right to abolish, separate, and reform government as
they saw fit.49 Senex turned Thatcher’s argument on its head. He argued
that if Article VII “contains no negative,” there was “no reason why [the
people] have not this right” to “reform, alter, or totally change their
government . . . even when their safety does not require it.”50 Senex applied
the same reasoning to Thatcher’s interpretation of Article XVII, stating:
The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence. Have
they a right to bear arms against the common defence? According to the
gentleman’s reasoning, I answer yes; for to say that a man has a certain right,
and that he is not denied any other use of the right, is most assuredly saying
that he possesses that right for every purpose.51

Here, Senex revealed a fatal philosophical flaw in Thatcher’s
interpretation of Article XVII. By the late eighteenth century, it was wellsettled that it was a dangerous idea to interpret the right to keep and bear
arms as including a right to revolt.52 Such an interpretation ran afoul of the
constitutional restraints placed on the right since its inception in the 1689
English Declaration of Rights.53
However, it seems that Senex missed the thrust of Thatcher’s
argument. At no point in his previous editorials did Thatcher advocate the
lawfulness of armed rebellion; he actually denounced such behavior as

48

Id. (emphasis added).
The Massachusetts Assembly would clarify this matter by passing a statute that made it only
lawful to “bear arms for the common defence”:
Whereas in a free government, where the people have a right to bear arms for the common
defence, and the military power is held in subordination to the civil authority, it is necessary for
the safety of the State, that the virtuous citizens thereof should hold themselves in readiness, and
when called upon, should exert their efforts to support the civil government, and oppose attempts
of factious and wicked men, who may wish to subvert the laws and constitution of their
country . . . .
Act of Feb. 20, 1787, ch. 9, 1787 Mass. Acts 564.
50
Senex, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Jan. 12, 1787, at 1.
51
Id.
52
See Charles, supra note 30, at 32–35, 44–59.
53
See Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence?”: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of
the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 421–54 (2009) (discussing the American
understanding of this provision); Charles, supra note 30, at 24–60 (discussing the legal restraints on
Blackstone’s fifth auxiliary right).
49
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“essentially different”54 and not seeking a redress of grievances “in a legal
way.”55
To clarify his stance, Thatcher offered the following response:
The right to reform or alter government, is not created by the Bill of
Rights . . . . [It] is a right independent of the Bill of Rights, and exists in the
people anterior to their forming themselves into government . . . . Senex asks
if the people have a right to bear arms against the common defence? I answer,
that whatever right people had to use arms in a state of nature, they retain at
the present time, notwithstanding the 17th article of the Bill of Rights.56

Thatcher’s response clarifies that he was articulating the right of
governmental self-preservation or what Blackstone deemed the “fifth
auxiliary right.”57 He understood that once a civil compact is created, the
people “surrender a certain portion of their alienable rights; or rather, to
vest in certain persons, a power to make laws for, and controul the alienable
rights of, the whole.”58 At the same time though, should the government
fail to produce the “end of government,” i.e. the “happiness of the people,”
the people, through their representatives, retain the power to reform or alter
government.59
Thatcher elaborated on this point in a subsequent editorial, writing:
The right to institute government, and the right to alter and change a bad
government, I call the same right: I see no difference between them. The end
of this right is the greatest happiness of the greatest number of the people; and
the means or object made use of, is government. This right I understand to be a
physical power, under the direction of reason, to bring about this happiness.
Therefore, when the people have agreed upon a certain set of rules, which they
denominate government . . . they are binding, on the presumption that they will
produce the degree of happiness before mentioned . . . . It is not the existence
of government, or any agreement contained therein, that gives the people a
right to destroy it when it does not answer the end for which it was instituted.
The existence of a bad government only affords an opportunity for this
right . . . to come into exercise.60

In its entirety, the Senex and Thatcher debate reveals much on
constitutional interpretation, especially the founding generation’s views on
54

Scribble Scrabble, supra note 39, at 2.
Scribble Scrabble, supra note 37, at 1.
56
Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Jan. 26, 1787, at 1.
57
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139 (“The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject,
that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to their condition and
degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute I W. & M. stat. 2 c.
2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of
oppression.”).
58
Scribble Scrabble, supra note 56, at 1.
59
Id.
60
Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Mar. 23, 1787, at 4.
55
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the right to keep and bear arms. Although the 1780 Massachusetts
Constitution only guaranteed the right for the “common defence,”61
Thatcher reminds us that this does not foreclose other uses of arms for
lawful purposes. As Thatcher stated in his penultimate editorial to Senex:
The question is not, whether two persons can have an exclusive right to the
same thing, at one and the same time; but, whether the bill of rights, by
securing to the people a right originally in them [in a state of
nature] . . . thereby prohibits them the other uses of that right, which they also
had originally a right to.62

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Senex and Thatcher debate is
that it gives historical credence to the argument that only the core of the
Second Amendment should receive elevated protection. Meanwhile, any
interests that fall outside of this core should be given minimized
protections,63 especially if they fall within the accepted ideological and
philosophical restraints as the Founders understood.64
Thatcher illustrated this legal concept many times over.65 He
understood that the Bill of Rights imposes constitutional limits on the
legislature. In the case of Article XVII, this meant that the “right to keep
and bear arms for the common defence” was “prefixed to the
[C]onstitution” and was “never to be infringed.”66 Meanwhile, all other
uses of arms were “alienable right[s]” and could be “abridged by the
legislature as they may think for the general good.”67
If one applies Thatcher’s concept of the public good to contemporary
gun control laws, Professor Rosenthal’s concerns about the constitutionality
of open-carry and concealed-carry restrictions are alleviated, and Heller’s
classification of such prohibitions as “presumptively lawful”68 is
ideologically supported in history. While some legal commentators claim
that there is little, if any, historical evidence to support the proposition that
the framers would have agreed to open-carry or concealed-carry
prohibitions,69 they do so without understanding the ideological origins of
gun control.70
61

MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. I, art. XVII.
Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Mar. 16, 1787, at 4.
63
See United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26508, at *24–26 (4th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2010); see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 923, 976–77 (2009).
64
For a working analysis of this historical approach, see Charles, supra note 4, at 14–30.
65
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
66
Scribble Scrabble, supra note 42.
67
Id.
68
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008) (discussing limitations on
carrying weapons in “sensitive places”).
69
See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1480–81, 1516–29 (2009)
[hereinafter Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms]; Eugene Volokh, The First and
62
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It is common practice for legal commentators to envision the framing
era as a utopia that casted off our Anglo and international origins to start
anew.71 However, such broad assertions fail to take into account that the
Framers were well attuned to English and international precedent. For
instance, Associate Justice Samuel Chase kept a journal compiling all of the
British case law still in force within the United States;72 John Marshall used
the treatises of Hugo Grotius, William Blackstone, and Emer de Vattel to
argue cases;73 and some states adopted English statutes in their entirety even
after independence.74
This last point is of particular significance in understanding the
constitutionality of open-carry or concealed-carry prohibitions. In 1328,
King Edward III and Parliament implemented the Statute of Northampton,
making it unlawful “to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs,
Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no
part elsewhere.”75 The Statute remained in force in the states of
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia, even after the adoption of the
U.S. Constitution.76 In the case of North Carolina, the statute read almost
Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101–02 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.
org/articles/the-first-and-second-amendments [hereinafter Volokh, The First and Second Amendments].
70
Discarding the philosophical and ideological origins of gun control also runs afoul of the Heller
and McDonald opinions. See Charles, supra note 4, at 21–30.
71
For example, for over a century, legal commentators have asserted that the Supreme Court
created the plenary power doctrine over aliens, citizenship, foreign affairs, and naturalization. See, e.g.,
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858–63 (1987) (describing Supreme Court cases expanding the federal
government’s powers over immigration); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550–
60 (1990) (detailing the development and contours of the plenary power doctrine). However, the plenary
power doctrine is deeply rooted in the Anglo-American tradition and was acknowledged as such by all
the prominent constitutional commentators in the late eighteenth century. See Patrick J. Charles, The
Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusion: A Historical Perspective,
15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61, 67–91 (2010).
72
See Samuel Chase, British Case Law Citations (1800) (unpublished journal) (on file with the
Library of Congress Rare Books Division, Wash., D.C.).
73
See James Iredell, Middle Circuit, 1793, Virginia 4, 5–6 (1793) (unpublished journal of oral
arguments) (on file with the Library of Congress Rare Books Division, Washington, D.C.).
74
For example, Maryland adopted and maintained the English common law and much of the
statutory structure when it adopted its Constitution following the Declaration of Independence. See MD.
CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. III; cf. Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution
for the United States of America (1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1778–1788, at 133, 137 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., New York 1888) (“[W]e did not dissolve our connection with [England] so much on
account of its constitution, as the perversion and mal-administration of it.” (footnote omitted)).
75
Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.); see also 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350)
(Eng.) (“[If] any Man of this Realm ride armed covertly or secretly with Men of Arms against any
other . . . it shall be judged Treason.”); 1 Jac. 1, c. 8 (1603–04) (Eng.) (also known as the Statute of
Stabbing).
76
See 2 THE PERPETUAL LAWS, OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTION TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL COURT, IN 1798, at
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identical to the Statute of Northampton by prohibiting riding armed “by
night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the King’s
Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere.”77
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Statute of Northampton is that
it contains no intent requirement for the conduct to be otherwise unlawful.78
One merely had to go or ride armed in “fairs, markets,” or other populated
enclaves. The same was true for the 1285 statute of Edward I, which made
it unlawful to go or wander “about the Streets” of London, “after Curfew
tolled . . . with Sword or Buckler, or other Arms for doing Mischief . . . nor
any in any other Manner, unless he be a great Man or other lawful Person
of good repute.”79 It was not until 1350 that there was any mention of an
intent requirement for going armed, but this statute did not amend or
override the Statute of Northampton. Instead, it affirmed that it was a
separate felony if “any Man of this Realm ride armed covertly or secretly
with Men of Arms against any other.”80 Furthermore, the 1350 statute
clarified to the courts that such malicious intent did not qualify as treason,
stating that riding armed “covertly or secretly . . . against any other . . . shall
be judged [a] Felony or Trespass, according to the Laws of the Land of old
Time used, and according as the Case requireth.”81
But some commentators fail to recognize these legal differences and
the ideological impetus of such statutes. For example, the ideological
impetus for the Statute of Northampton was the potential danger posed by
individuals going or riding armed, not malicious intent.82 In contrast,
Professor Eugene Volokh83 claims the Statute was “understood by the
Framers as covering only those circumstances where carrying of arms was
259 (Worcester, Isaiah Thomas 1799) (confirming that no person “shall ride or go armed offensively, to
the fear or terror of the good citizens of this Commonwealth”); FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A
COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTHCAROLINA 61 (n.p., Newbern 1792); A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA 33 (n.p., Augustine Davis 1794) (confirming that no person may “go nor ride armed by night
nor by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places,” or in the presence of the Court’s Justices or other
ministers of justice).
77
MARTIN, supra note 76, at 61 (emphasis added).
78
See Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.).
79
Statutes for the City of London, 1285, 13 Edw. 1 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
80
25 Edw. 3, 1350, stat. 5, c. 2, § 13 (Eng.). Differentiation between the 1350 statute and the
Statute of Northampton is supported by Coke’s Institutes. See EDWARDO COKE, THE THIRD PART OF
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE
CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 159–60 (London, E&R Brooke 1797) (showing the “clause of the
statute 25 E. 3” was a treason distinction).
81
25 Edw. 3, 1350 stat. 5, c. 2, § 13 (Eng.).
82 See Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus
Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1938950.
83
Briefly addressing Professor Volokh’s writings on the history of the Second Amendment is
significant, for Professor Rosenthal in part relies on his opinions. See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note
1, at 88.
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unusual and therefore terrifying.”84 Quoting William Hawkins’s Pleas of
the Crown, Volokh asserts that the Statute solely stands for the legal
proposition that “public carrying ‘accompanied with such circumstances as
are apt to terrify the people’ was . . . seen as prohibited,” but “‘wearing
common weapons’ in ‘the common fashion’ was legal.”85
However, this assessment of the historical record is misleading. First,
Professor Volokh omits the fact that Hawkins was referring to a legal
exception for persons of “quality” or the nobility’s right to wear arms and
be accompanied by armed escorts.86 Such persons were exempt because
they were presumed to be “in no danger of offending” the law, or having
“an intention to commit any act of violence, or disturbance of the peace.”87
This legal presumption would not have applied to the average subject or
citizen. Moreover, whether an individual was of noble birth did not matter
if they wore any dangerous “armour in public, by alledging that such a one
threatened him, and that he wears it for the safety of his person from his
assault.”88
Second, Volokh’s characterization of the Statute of Northampton
assumes Hawkins’s reference to “terrify” equates with actual intent to do
harm with arms or the conduct of doing so. However, if one takes into
account eighteenth-century restrictions on firearms and the actual text of the
Statute, one would presume that the general carrying of pistols or firearms
in populated areas would have qualified as violating the Statute. Take, for
instance, a 1754 charge to the grand jury in London, where an assault was
described as being committed should a person hold up their fist, “present[] a
Gun,” or use “any other Instrument in a threatening Manner, where the
Person threatened is within the Reach, or Effect of it.”89 While one may
84

Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, supra note 69, at 101.
Id. at 102 (quoting 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 136, ch. 63,
§ 9 (1716)).
86
1 HAWKINS, supra note 85, at 136, ch. 63, § 9. The full quote to which Volokh refers reads:
That Persons of Quality are in no Danger of Offending against this Statute by wearing common
Weapons, or having their usual Number of Attendants with them, for their Ornament or Defence,
in such Places, and upon such Occasions, in which it is the common Fashion to make use of them,
without causing the least Suspicion of an Intention to commit any Act of Violence or Disturbance
of the Peace.
Id. This law was the exception to the general rule that it was unlawful for people to carry arms in public
under the auspices of self-defense. Hawkins writes:
That a Man cannot excuse the wearing such Armour in Publick, by alledging that such a one
threatened him, and that he wears it for the Safety of his Person from his Assault; but it hath been
resolved, That no one shall incur the Penalty of the said Statute for assembling his Neighbours and
Friends in his own House, against those who threaten to do him any Violence therein, because a
Man’s House is as his Castle.
85

Id. at 136, ch. 63, § 8.
87
JAMES PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 11 (John Patterson 1788) (quoting 1 HAWKINS, supra
note 85, at 136, ch. 63, § 9).
88
Id. at 12.
89
43 CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY 1689–1803, at 385 (Georges Lamoine ed., 1992).
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debate what would constitute “presenting a Gun,” openly carrying a
firearm, flashing it, or having it loaded does “present” to others that you
pose more of a potential threat than the average person does.90
Third, even assuming Volokh’s interpretation of the Statute of
Northampton (that there is a “dangerousness” requirement) is the correct
one, it misses the ideological and philosophical point of the law: preventing
public injury, ensuring the public peace, and providing for the public
good.91 For example, James Davis’s 1774 treatise, entitled The Office and
Authority of a Justice of the Peace, stated that the Statute stood for the
premise that “unusual and offensive Weapons” were prohibited “among the
great Concourse of the People.”92 While there is room for debate as to what
weapons would have qualified as “dangerous,” “unusual,” or “offensive,”
there is substantiated evidence to suggest that loaded firearms and pistols
qualified in populated areas. This is supported by eighteenth-century
ordinances in Boston and Newburyport. As early as 1746, Boston made it
unlawful for any person to “discharge any Gun or Pistol charged with Shot
or Ball in the Town,” including “any Part of the Harbour between the Castle
of said Town.”93 This ordinance was reaffirmed in 1768 by the Boston
Selectmen, which included John Hancock.94 The ordinance was required
because “divers of the Inhabitants ha[d] been lately surprized and
endangered by the firing of Muskets charged with Shot or Ball on the Neck,
90

The author retracts his statement in the Colloquy version of this Essay that the “limits of
eighteenth-century firearm technology made it nearly impossible to holster or carry a loaded firearm,
especially a pistol, but for very short periods.” After consulting Williamsburg Colonial Foundation’s
Master Gunsmith George Suiter, the author learned eighteenth-century firearms could be preloaded and
effectively fire so long as the powder was not exposed to moisture or the ball was not dislodged from the
bottom of the barrel. See E-mail from George Suiter, Master Gunsmith, Williamsburg Colonial
Foundation, to author (Jan. 16, 2012, 10:56 EST) (on file with author).
For an overview of eighteenth-century firearm technology, see WILLIAM E. BURNS, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 110–14 (2005). For contemporaneous evidence that one would
generally have to “present” a loaded pistol and that it would have been seen as terrifying, see WILLIAM
DUANE, A REPORT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY TRANSACTIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE AT PHILADELPHIA, IN
FEBRUARY 1799, at 9–10 (Phila., Office of the Aurora 1799) (“He then pulled out a pistol and presented
it towards the body of J. Gallagher . . . which part of the body, he could not expressly say. I supposed
the person who pulled out the pistol to be insulting the congregation by some means or other . . . . I felt
very much alarmed at the sight of fire-arms, and I did not know how to act in the business, for it was
difficult to engage with a man having fire-arms . . . .”); id. at 43 (“We do not see [the defendant] behave
as a peaceable citizen now. Where is this good, this quiet man? [N]o, he has a loaded pistol in his
pocket; thus armed, he throws the gauntlet, by this he invited insult; he puts the whole church at
defiance; he says come on with you, I am now ready for you. He seems to have wished to be
attacked . . . .”).
91
For a great summary of the importance of the public good as a legal concept, see DUANE, supra
note 90, at 21. See also Charles, supra note 41.
92
JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (Newbern 1774).
93
An Act to Prevent the Firing of Guns Charged with Shot or Ball in the Town of Boston, reprinted
in BOS. WKLY. NEWSL., Sept. 18, 1746, at 2.
94
RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, SELECTMEN’S MINUTES FROM 1764
THROUGH 1768 307 (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1889).
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Common, and other Parts of the Town.”95 Exceptions in both ordinances
were given to militia during times of muster.96 However, there were no
exceptions for personal self-defense. In 1785, the town of Newburyport,
Massachusetts adopted a similar provision:
That no person (excepting the militia, when under arms, on muster-days, and
by command of their officers) shall fire off any sort of gun, pistol, squib,
cracker or other thing charged or composed in whole, or in part of gunpowder, in any of the streets, lanes or public ways in this town, nor so near
thereto as to affright any horse, or in any sort tend to affright, annoy or injure
any person whatever—nor shall any person discharge at a mark or other-wise
any gun, charged with ball, at any time or front any place within this town, nor
in any direction but such only as from time to time shall be approved of and
licensed by the town, or by the select-men thereof.97

Indeed, the ordinances said nothing about carrying unloaded firearms,
but discharging and firing arms in general were prohibited to protect the
general welfare. There is substantial evidence that the founding generation
viewed the assembling of arms without the authority of the government as
dangerous to the public peace. While one may argue that prohibiting the
carrying of firearms in public—open or concealed—substantially burdens
an individual’s right to personal self-defense,98 such an argument fails to
take into account that the Founders sought to prevent public injury and limit
potential riots, routs, tumults, and assemblages of arms.99 This includes the
Massachusetts Assembly passing such a statute to keep the peace from
potential dangers like Shays’s Rebellion.100 These laws were premised on

95

BOS. POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, Sept. 5, 1768, at 1.
Id.; Act to Prevent the Firing of Guns Charged with Shot or Ball in the Town of Boston, supra
note 93.
97
ESSEX J. & MASS. & N.H. GEN. ADVERTISER (Newburyport, Mass.), May 11, 1785, at 2.
98
See Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 69, at 1516–29.
99
For some examples, see Act of Feb. 20, 1787, ch. 9, 1787 Mass. Acts 564; Act of Feb. 24, 1797,
ch. 637, 1797 N.J. Laws 179; Act of Dec. 20, 1763, ch. 1233, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 748–49 (Albany, James B. Lyon, 1894); Act of
1705, ch. 128, 1705 Pa. Laws 153.
100
On October 26, 1786 the following law was passed by the Massachusetts Assembly:
That from & after the publication of this act, if any persons, to the number of twelve, or more,
being armed with clubs or other weapons; or if any number of persons, consisting of thirty, or
more, shall be unlawfully, routously, riotously or tumultuously assembled, any Justice of the
Peace, Sheriff, or Deputy . . . or Constable . . . shall openly make [a] proclamation [asking them to
disperse, and if they do not disperse within one hour, the officer is] . . . empowered, to require the
aid of a sufficient number of persons in arms . . . and if any such person or persons [assembled
illegally] shall be killed or wounded, by reason of his or their resisting the persons endeavouring to
disperse or seize them, the said Justice, Sheriff, Deputy-Sheriff, Constable and their assistants,
shall be indemnified, and held guiltless.
An Act to Prevent Routs, Riots, and Tumultuous Assemblies, and the Evil Consequences Thereof,
reprinted in CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Nov. 17, 1786, at 1.
96
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the interest of the public good101 and viewed as essential to prevent public
injury.
Thus, although most modern open-carry and concealed-carry
prohibitions do not exactly parallel the Statute of Northampton or other
eighteenth-century firearms laws, their differences do not challenge the
principle that the government could make it unlawful to “go . . . armed”102
in public areas,103 and that legislatures must have the power to restrict the
use, possession, and operation of arms for the “good of the whole.”104 As
Judge George Thatcher eloquently put it, unless the Constitution provides
an affirmative and unalienable guarantee, any other use of arms can be
“abridged by the legislature as they may think for the general good.”105
II. A “WELL REGULATED” PROBLEM: THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING
THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S PREFATORY LANGUAGE
Even before District of Columbia v. Heller, misconceptions of the
Framers’ “well regulated militia” language have polluted modern Second
Amendment scholarship. Advocates of a broad interpretation of the Second
Amendment have asserted the myth that the individual use, ownership, and
exercise of “arms” effectuated the constitutional purpose of a “well
regulated militia.”106 This myth continues to pollute Second Amendment
scholarship.107

101

William Blackstone defined the “public good” as “nothing more essentially interested, than in
the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law.” 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135. In other words, “the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently
does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce.” Id. Pennsylvania Judge Alexander Addison
discussed the importance of the “public good” in America’s constitutional system:
To produce virtue, or public utility, is the true end of government. Virtue is most effectually
produced, by making it the interest of each individual, to promote the public good. That form of
government must be good, which necessarily combines the individual, with the general, interest;
and that form of government must be bad, which necessarily disjoins them. That therefore must be
the best form of government, which most effectually and inseparably combines and unites the
general and individual interest: and this is most effectually done, in a democratic republic.
ALEXANDER ADDISON, CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURIES OF THE COUNTIES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT IN
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 93 (Wash., John Colerick 1800). Addison further discussed the
importance that legislatures do not give into popular sentiment that deviates from the public good. He
wrote, “[If] [o]fficers are . . . seduced, by a love of what is called popularity, to give that kind of flattery
to the people . . . in accommodating their conduct to the humour of the day, or the solicitation of the
applicant,” instead of the public good, the “true end of the office, serving the public is perverted into a
false end, pleasing the public; the duty of the office is betrayed; the constitutional end of the office is
defeated.” Id. at 157–58.
102
Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.).
103
See DAVIS, supra note 92, at 13; MARTIN, supra note 76, at 61; PARKER, supra note 87, at 11–
12.
104
Scribble Scrabble, supra note 42.
105
Id.
106
See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 61–65, 85, 144 (2d ed. 1994); Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker’s
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But to the founding generation, a “well regulated militia” indicated
something far more specific—and far more important—than a well-armed
citizenry. A “well regulated militia” provided constitutional balance and
united the people in defense of their rights, liberties, and property in order
to extol Machiavelli’s virtù and unite the people as a common
community.108 A “well regulated militia” was a state-sanctioned109
constitutional body of citizens capable of bearing arms so men could train
together in the art of war and foster an esprit de corps.110 It was a body of
citizen soldiers, professionally disciplined and trained to prevent the
establishment of standing armies and to provide a constitutional check on
the federal government.111
A “well regulated militia” was not “merely . . . well-trained,” as
Professor Malcolm asserts it was.112 Such a loose definition ignores the rich
history of Machiavellian influence on the concept of a constitutional
militia,113 the detailed seventeenth- and eighteenth-century tracts on the
constitutional significance of a “well regulated militia,”114 the inclusion of
the institution in five state constitutions by 1789,115 and the First and Second
Congress debates over the institution when implementing the 1792 National
Militia Act.116 Furthermore, it makes little sense for the Founding Fathers to
have toasted to a “well regulated militia”117 and referred to the constitutional
body as the “palladium of liberty”118 if “well regulated” merely meant wellSecond Amendment: Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty,” 3 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 120, 130
(2007) [hereinafter Halbrook, St. George Tucker’s Second Amendment].
107
See David T. Hardy, Ducking the Bullet: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent,
2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 61, 66–67, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/
HARDY_2010_61.pdf (pointing out this line of argument),.
108
See Charles, supra note 6, at 9–85.
109 See Patrick J. Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second Amendment, and Individual
Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical Perspective, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 374–90 (2011)
(discussing that “the people” never maintained an individual right to associate with non-state-sanctioned
militias).
110
Charles, supra note 6, at 9–85.
111
Id.
112
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 106.
113
See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavelli, Harrington and English
Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 549 (1965).
114
Charles, supra note 6, at 9–35.
115
DEL. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES art. IX; MD.
CONST. of 1776, art. XXV; N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. XXIV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XL; VA.
CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIII.
116
See Charles, supra note 109, at 331–90.
117
See Charles, supra note 6, at 79 n.402, 87.
118
See id. at 44–50, 55; Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, the Second Amendment
and Originalist Methodology: A Critical Comment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 406, 407 (2009),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/13/LRColl2009n13Cornell.pdf.
Some
commentators have improperly asserted that the Founders viewed “arms” or individual self-defense as
the “palladium of liberty.” See Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on
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trained. The fact is that a “well regulated militia” was seen as crucial to the
success of a democratic government.119 Returning to the debate over the
constitutionality of the Portland Convention, one editorial writer even
commented that, should Maine form a separate state, it was important for
the new government to include “a well regulated Militia of the People,
between fifteen and forty years old; and none to be eligible to any office
among them, but such as first serve in the ranks.”120
I agree with Professor Malcolm’s dismissal of Professor Rosenthal’s
analysis of a “well regulated militia.”121 Indeed, Professor Rosenthal is
correct that the Framers envisioned that the states would retain “general
regulatory power over the possession and carrying of firearms.”122
However, it is historical invention to assert that the Second Amendment’s
preamble in any way refers to the general regulation of “arms,” for this
understanding of the phrase “well regulated militia” is not at all supported
by the historical record.
Professor Rosenthal seems to arrive at his thesis by mistakenly
equating the general people with the unorganized militia.123 But the Second
Amendment speaks only of the right to “keep and bear arms” in the
constraints of a “well regulated militia,” not an unorganized militia.124
Furthermore, Rosenthal conflates the Heller right of individual self-defense
in the home with that of a “well regulated militia” right to “keep and bear
arms.”125 The two protections are distinct in both law and history. As the
Heller decision makes clear, the issue before the Court was not the
constitutional scope of “keeping and bearing” arms to effectuate a “well
regulated militia.” Instead, the holding was that the Second Amendment
also protects the right to use handguns in the home for self-defense.126 It
was only this narrow holding that the McDonald decision affirmed and
the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1220 (1996) (arguing that the “true palladium of liberty”
includes armed individual self-defense); Halbrook, St. George Tucker’s Second Amendment, supra note
106; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 606 (2008) (stating that Tucker was
describing armed individual self-defense).
119
Charles, supra note 6, at 51–85.
120
A Watch-Word to the People of Maine, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Oct.19, 1786,
at 2.
121
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 106.
122
Id. at 93.
123
This myth has seeped into some appellate courts. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 464
(9th Cir. 2009) (Gould, J., concurring), vacated on reh’g en banc, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010);
Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 582 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). However, Supreme
Court precedent limits the “militia” to those who are capable of bearing arms. See Heller, 554 U.S. at
595–96 (2008) (confirming its holding in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)); Miller, 307
U.S. at 179; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). For a historical analysis of who constitutes
the militia in the constraints of the 1792 National Militia Act, see Charles, supra note 108, at 367–72.
124
The Founders understood the difference between an “unregulated” or “ill-regulated militia” and
a “well regulated militia.” See Charles, supra note 6, at 9–17.
125
Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 92–94.
126
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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incorporated to the States, as is evidenced by the hundred-page plurality
opinion’s failure to address the phrase “well regulated militia.”
To be precise, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Second
Amendment contains two core rights. The first is the right of “the people”
to possess handguns for self-defense at home. Although the Second
Amendment does not expressly state this right, the Heller Court determined
the right to be the “central component”127 due to its Anglo origins128 and
contemporaneous state analogues.129 The second core right is that of
participating in the common defense in a “well regulated militia.”130
Participation ensured that citizens understood and appreciated life, liberty,
and property, and provided a constitutional counterpoise to standing armies
by ensuring that the people would be dependent upon themselves for the
national defense.131
Naturally, the two core rights are distinct in what they protect. The
core right to armed individual self-defense of the home with a handgun is
divorced from the militia, and falls within the general police power of
government. Meanwhile, the core right to participate in defending one’s
liberties in a “well regulated militia” is intimately connected with
government. It is a right severely limited in scope because the federal and
state governments have concurrent power to arm, organize, and discipline
the militia, with the state governments possessing plenary authority to train
the militia.132
At the same time, however, the two core rights are interrelated in that
both are controlled by the interest of the public good. Just as legislatures
may restrict or prohibit the individual use, possession, and operation of
arms “whenever they shall think the good of the whole require it,”133 the
Founders believed in unfettered governmental regulation over the militia
127

Id. at 599 (emphasis removed).
See id. at 592–95. The Court came to this conclusion by adopting Professor Malcolm’s thesis.
See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT
(1994). However, the consensus among English historians is that Malcolm’s thesis “is flawed on this
point.” See Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6–
40, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
129
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 600–02; PA. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIII (“That
the people have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state . . . .”); VT. CONST. OF
1786, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVIII (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence
of themselves and the State . . . .”).
130
See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886); J.G.A. POCOCK, 1 BARBARISM AND RELIGION:
THE ENLIGHTENMENTS OF EDWARD GIBBON, 1737–1764, at 104 (1999); Charles, supra note 6, at 42–
85.
131
See generally WILLIAM THORNTON, THE COUNTERPOISE, BEING THOUGHTS ON A MILITIA AND
STANDING ARMY (2d ed. 1753) (describing the necessity and importance of obtaining a good militia);
GRANVILLE SHARP, TRACTS, CONCERNING THE ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL
DEFENCE BY A FREE MILITIA (photo. reprint 1903) (1782) (same).
132
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; Charles, supra note 109, at 340–44, 347–66.
133
Scribble Scrabble, supra note 42.
128
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that “will be productive of the greatest public benefit.”134 An anonymous
1789 editorial in the Independent Chronicle illustrates this very point by
posing the following question: “[W]hat would you think of a militia who
should use their arms to oppress, terrify, plunder, and vex their peaceable
neighbours, and then say they were armed for the common good, and must
be free?”135
The question was posed to illuminate the point that the “freedom of the
press” is a right that could be regulated to protect the “reputation,”
“feelings,” and “peace of a citizen.”136 This same premise of the “common
good” holds true with the “right to keep and bear arms” to effect the
Constitution’s “well regulated militia.” As the anonymous writer pointed
out, “there are laws to restrain the militia,” and any laws that restrict the
freedom of the press are similar because both “prevent the wonton injury
and destruction of individuals” and ensure there is a legal “line some where,
or the peace of society would be destroyed by the very instrument designed
to promote it.”137
CONCLUSION
As Second Amendment jurisprudence moves forward, it is improper
for legal commentators to claim that the history of the founding generation
does not provide us with any historical guideposts, clues, or originalist
insight as to the constitutionality of modern gun-control regulations or
prohibitions. Restrictions on arms date back to the beginning of our Anglo
heritage and evolved based on the interests of the public good. Indeed, the
Constitution provides unalienable rights that legislatures may never infringe
upon. However, in the constraints of the Second Amendment, the Supreme
Court has only identified two core rights138—both of which have a strong
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historical pedigree that can provide the courts with insight into the
Amendment’s intended meaning and proper purpose.
While modern gun-control laws will never exactly parallel their
eighteenth-century counterparts, the Founders adhered to certain
philosophical and ideological restraints on the “right to arms” that courts
can apply today.139 Perhaps most importantly, the Founders saw a legal
difference between the right to “keep and bear arms for the common
defence” and other uses of arms. Legal commentators need to recognize
this legal distinction—a militia, organized or unorganized, falls within a
different subset of the law. This distinction is not only recognized by
Supreme Court precedent, but can be found in the text of the Constitution,140
and was even acknowledged by Freedmen during the tumultuous
Reconstruction period.141
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